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MODERATOR (Lindsay Wiley): After that
fantastic introduction to personalized medicine,
to the possibilities it raises, and to the potential
hurdles to fulfilling that promise, we're going
to turn now to a more in-depth discussion of
ethical, privacy, and budgetary issues raised
by personalized medicine. I'll do a quick
introduction of each of our panelists and then
give them the floor.
First, ve will be hearing from Ben Berkman,
who is the deputy director of the Bioethics
Core at the National Human Genome Research
Institute and is also a faculty member in the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Department
of Bioethics. He's also an adjunct professor
at Georgetown ILaw and the University of
Maryland School of Law, where he teaches
courses on bioethics and science policy. Ben

and I workced together at the O'Neill Institute for
National and Global Health Lav, where he was
deputy director. His previous experience also
includes work with the Ethics Department of
the American Medical Association, ABC News

Medical Unit, and the Economic and Social
Research Institute. He's worked on projects with
the World Health Organization, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, and an Institute
of Medicine Committee relating to pandemic
influenza preparedness.
After Ben, we'll be hearing from Stacey M.
Brandenburg, who is an adjunct professor of law
here at the Washington College of Law (WCL).
She focuses on emerging privacy and information
technology issues, including online behavioral
advertising, social networking, and identity
theft. Previously, she served in the Federal
Trade Commission's (FTC) Division of Privacy
and Identity Protection, where she addressed
information privacy issues from a policy and
enforcement perspective. Prior to joining the
FTC, Professor Brandenburg practiced at Steptoe
and Johnson, IfP where she advised technology
and telecommunications clients on e-comrnmerce,
privacy, and data security issues.
Next, We'll hear from Melanie Teplinsky, who is
also an adjunct professor of law here at WCL.
Her area of expertise is cyber law, and she
practiced, as well, at Steptoe and Johnson, LL.P,
where she counseled leading financial services,
telecommunications, and other multi-national
clients on a wide array of issues, including
cyber security, data protection., and electronic
surveillance. She also previously worked on
information technology and privacy policy issues
in the Executive Office of the President at OMB,
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Finally, we'll hear from Wayne Rosenkrans,
who is the non-lawyer on the panel. He holds a
PhD in cell and molecular biology from Boston
University. He's chairman of the board of
directors of the Personalized Medicine Coalition,
a distinguished fellow at the Center for Biological
Innovation at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), and a member of the Ethics
and Systems Medicine Program at CGeorgetoxwn
Univ ersity. He's also vice president for Strategic
C onsulting at Fuld and Company, and chief
scientific advisor at Expertech. Prexviously, he
xvas diirector of exteirnal irelations for Peirsonalized
Health Care and Uvidence-Based Medicine at
AstraZeneca. Prior to that. he wvas involved in

research and development and strategy policy at both AstraZeneca
and Smith-Kline Beecham. He is a former president of the Society
of Competitive Intelligence Professionals and has received the
Society's Fellows Award and Lifetime Achievement Award in
Intelligence. He's active on several advisory boards, including the
Institute of Medicine, IBM Life Science, and HP Life Sciences.
We'll save a bit of time at the end for questions.
REMARKS FROM BEN BERKMAN**
So, I suppose I'm a lawyer. I'm trained as a lawyer, but I sometimes
don't identify as a lawyer. So what I want to do today is take a
step back. This is going to be a little bit different than the first
panel; I want to change our frame. Personalized medicine is built
on research, genetic and genomic research, and what I want to talk
about is some of the ethical issues that are being raised by next
generation genoinic sequencing technology. I -work at the National
Institute of Health (NIH) with lots of investigators doing this kind
of personalized medicine research, building the blocks on which
the genomic-influenced clinical practice will be based.
This next generation sequencing has some very, very complicated
ethical questions that it raises. There are, obviously, implications
beyond research into clinical care, including prenatal, whole
genome sequencing. But my focus is going to be on research
ethics. We're not quite ready for clinical applications, so these are
the ethical problems that we're being faced with right now.
First, I want to describe the magnitude of incidental results. We'll
be talking about incidental genomic research results, and you'll
figure out what that means in a second, but I want to describe what
they are and the magnitude of the problem. I want to present some
of the research ethics literature to show you how this is really a very
controversial topic and that there's no ethical consensus yet. Then I
want to give you my gloss on it and show you some of the questions
and controversies that I think we need to look at as the debate moves
forward.
Let's start with a definition. There are a number of definitions,
but what we're talking about, an incidental result, is a finding
concerning an individual research participant that has potential
health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course
of conducting research, but is beyond the aims of the study. So

imagine you come in and you enroll in a cancer study. They're
sequencing your genetic material and they discover that you have
a gene that predisposes you to Alzheimer's or to schizophrenia, or
that you're a carrier for a certain rare but serious genetic condition.
These are all things that have nothing to do with the reason you
came to the research.
So, let me give you a little background, some technology. We're
on the cusp of seeing the widespread adoption of whole genome
sequencing; in the first panel, people maybe made a couple of
references to this, but we're moving from a paradigm where we're
doing targeted genetic testing to one where we can sequence the
entire genome. The cost of, the efficiency of, and the speed of
sequencing has taken a huge leap forward.
The cost is dropping, and because you all know about Moore's law
[Gordon E. Moore], one of the founders of Intel postulated that
every eighteen months the speed of computing for any given costs
will double. The rate of improvement in genoinic sequencing
technology has moved even faster. This improvement in sequencing
technology has resulted in a substantial increase in the amount of
data that can be generated about someone's genome.
Let me give you three definitions. There's targeted genetic testing,
where you're just sequencing a little bit of gene that you're interested
in or a region that you're interested in. There's exomic and genomic
sequencing. An exon is a protein coding region; the exome is all
of the protein coding regions in the genome. So that's basically
your genes, and the exome is the entire set of genes, the entire set
of protein coding regions in a given person's genome. And that
accounts for, depending who you ask, I percent to 3 percent of the
whole genome. The genome is the entire body of an individual's
genetic material. Just to give you a sense., it costs about $2,000
to do a whole exome sequence and about $7,000 to do a whole
genome sequence.
A few years ago. it was science fiction to talk about the $1,000
genome. It's almost a reality now. Whereas it took ten years and a
billion dollars to do the first whole genome sequence, now it takes a
few days and a few thousand dollars. What does this mean for the
ethics of genetic research 9 The general argument is that the whole
exome or whole genome sequencing does not raise novel ethical
concerns, but significantly magnifies and makes more concrete
many of the risks that have been relatively theoretical to this point.
Incidental findings are one of those huge problems. I xork with
institutional rev iew boards (IRB), and I work with investigators.
They'ic all sciatching thcir heads: "What do wve do? XWe're going
to generate so much information, some of which is going to be
really important, really clinically important. What do we do wvith
it 9 Do we return it? Do we not return it? How do we convey this
information to subjets ?"
There are some IRBs who say, "You know what? We're not touching
it. You can't iretuirn any incidental findings)' and thcrc are other
IRBs who say, "You knoxv what? You have an ethical obligation,
and wve're not going to approve your study unless you come up w ith
a plan for returning incidental findings." I just want to give you a
sense. These are some numbers. The numbers themselves aren't

that important, but I have a colleague who just did a whole genome
sequence, so I want to give you a sense, tangibly, of what this means.
He was looking at a very, very rare disease. He's not interested
in things like cancer or heart disease or schizophrenia; he's just
interested in finding the gene associated with this rare disease. And
he did a whole genome sequence on a pair of monozygotic twins.
The bottom number is the big one, 430 variance. He found 430
variants that he thought could be clinically important. That's a big
number. When he went through and checked it really carefully, and
this took him days, he got down to about eight likely pathogenic
variants and thirty potentially important pathogenic variants. He's
looking for these things because he's trained to do this, but this is
not part of his research. Fis research is specifically to look for the
gene associated with a specific rare disease, but he's found all of
these other things, and the question is what to do with them.
As we're thinking through this problem, we have a paper coming
out soon that really challenges the three assumptions that genetic
research has relied on. The first assumption is that genetic research
will produce very few clinically significant incidental findings, but
that's wrong. It's no longer a question ofwhether clinically relevant
results will be found, but how many. The second assumption is
that there's this distinction between incidental findings and findings
that are explicitly related to the disease under investigation. But
that's wrong too because when you're sequencing someone's whole
exome or whole genome, your methodology is to look at everything.
That's why you've sequenced everything. So, there's really not this
clear distinction between incidental and non-incidental findings.
Third, there's this notion of "don't look, don't tell." It's been the
norm in the research ethics community that researchers don't have an
obligation to act as clinicians and affirmatively search for incidental
findings. There's some controversy about that, but generally the
view is that you don't have to proactively go look for things. You're
not their doctor. You're a researcher. But with whole genome
sequencing the act of looking for all possible results becomes
much, much easier, and so the question is, "What obligation does
a researcher have to look for and return these incidental genetic
research findings?" In the research ethics community, there are
really two poles, and there's a continuum of positions.
Let me describe the poles first. Some people have argued
that there's a very strong obligation-I'm not talking about a
consideration; I'm not talking about an option to return incidental
findings. fIvestigators can do whatever they want. If they say,
"I feel personally that I neci to iretuirn findings." That's fine. But
this is a question about wvhether there is, beyond that, a proactive
obligation for all investigators wxho find these unexpected things to
return them. And so. somie of my colleagues actually have argued
that based on the principle of rcspect for pcrsons, thcire is a vecry
strong obligation to return research results when a subject asks for
them and, even in somie cases, vvhere it's so important you have
to go ask them to ask you for the research results. Others hasve
argucd, based on beneficence, ireciprocity, j ustice, and investigator
integrity and professional responsibility, that there's this very strong
obligation to return genetic research results.

On the other side of the continuum is this notion that there's no
obligation, and in fact, it's probably a bad idea to return incidental
research findings. This argument boils down to the notion that
the purpose of research isn't to benefit individuals, it's to generate
generalizeable knowledge, and that there are very real risks
associated .with conflating research in clinical care. And this has
very practical implications for resource limitations. Remember the
investigator I told you about only had basically one set of subjects.
They were twins with identical genetic codes. It took him two
or three days to analyze all that data, looking for those incidental
findings. If you have an n of a 100 or an n of a 1,000, can you really
expect researchers to spend that much energy looking for things
other than the question that they want to answer?
Those are the poles, and I'm setting up a false dichotomy here. In
the middle there are quite a few of the more reasonable frameworks.
These are some of the papers in working groups that have tried to
come up xwith the way to deal with this incidental findings problem,
but they don't agree. There's no consensus.
I ask the question, "Why is this so difficult?" It's not fair to say
that there's no consensus; there's some consensus. Most of these
proposals have focused on the kind of information that we would
want to return. There's a threshold where information deserves
to be returned. We can quibble about where that threshold is, but
generally, there's agreement that you need it to be analytically valid.
You need it to be clinically relevant, you need it to be actionable,
you need to be able to do something about it, and it needs to be

desired by the subject.
But that's not quite fair, because clinical relevance has proven to
be a nebulous term that's hard to define. There are at least four
different ways that you can define it, all of which draw the line at
a different place. Even this kind of fundamental idea that people
shouldn't be given information that they don't want is actually
being challenged, and we have an investigator at NIH who puts it in
his consent form that there's a certain class of extremely important
genetic information, that even if someone checks the box to say
"I don't want any incidental findings," he's going to return them
anyway. And then there are some very interesting legal issues about
analytic validity and whether the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) regulatory regime is appropriate, given the
volume of data that we're generating with xxwhole genome sequencing.
Most of the people have focused on this notion of the importance of
the information, the validity, and the clinical relevance.
There's an emerging idea that I'm cxploiring, that thc obligation
to return incidental findings could also be a function of the
research context, the study characteristics, and the population's
characteristics. And so there, you'd thin about things like the nature
of the study. Is it a clinical trial9 Is it a natural history study? Is it
a bench science, a basic science protocol? Non think about study
resources. For example. does the study have genetic counselors
on staff? You think about the investigator expertise. Is it an MD
researcher, or is it a PhD researcher? Peoplc that hasve PhDs, not
MDs, aren't necessarily qualified to look for and interpret clinically
relevant information. The specific aims of the study-is it a broad
study? Is it a narrow study? What is the feasibility of re-contact? A

lot of the studies are one-time blood draws where you don't even
keep their name or contact information.
Those are study characteristics. You could also think about it in
terms of subject characteristics. Do the subjects have an alternate
way of accessing the information? Are they dependent on this
study for their genetic testing? XWe had one case where it was an
investigator sequencing the BRCA, Breast Cancer Region, looking
for a novel variance, but it was foreseeable that he was going to
find a known variance in some of the subjects. The question was
whether he had an obligation to return that information. The salient
fact here is that this was a population that wouldn't have had access
to genetic testing and genetic counseling outside of this study.
The degree of vulnerability-and vulnerability is a problematic
word--and the depth ofthe relationship. IfI'ma clinical investigator
and I have monthly visits with you, that's a different consideration
than if I just take your blood once and don't even know your name.
Add up all of these study and population characteristics and put
them on the Y-axis. The X-axis is this type of information of clinical
significance that I described before.
Generally, people agree that the more important the information is,
and the more salient research context factors you have, the more
obligation there is to return findings. I think we have an agreement
that for really important things-wishere there's a really strong nexus
between the subject and the investigator---we should probably say
that there's an obligation to return those incidental findings. I think
we can also say that for unimportant information-facts that Won't
impact your clinical care, but might be interesting to you-and in
cases where there's not much of this research context nexus, that
maybe there's no obligation to return findings there.
But the problem is defining the marginal cases. I'm going to show
you two lines defining where the threshold is between that. Because
there are some kinds of studies where it's going to be really hard,
where there's some moderate relationship, where maybe it's a slightly
vulnerable population, where you're going to be discovering some
important information. And so, how you draw this line becomes
very problematic, and that's part of What my work is about. We're
seeing a range of cases, and IRBs are really struggling with this
notion of whether there's an obligation to return incidental findings
and how to weigh these situational factors.
I've gotten in some pretty---"heated," let's call them---discussions,
with some of my colleagucs about how hard investigators should
look for incidental findings. Some of them utilize a "stumble
strategies," thinking. "~Well, I've sequenced a svhole genoine. I'm
only luoking fur the specific infuormatiun that I'm iterested in. If
I stumble on something, I'll return it. If I cdon't, no big deal."~ But
is that an acceptable strategy'? Or do they have to have a proactive,
sy steinatic approach to interrogating a wvhole genome, looking for
potentially clinically relesvant incidental findings? And then, is
it appropriate to hold different kinds of insvestigator s to cdifferent
ethical standards because medical geneticists could come up wvith
a very rigorous sway of looking at a genome. but a PhD biologist
might not be able to do that? Do research teams have to hire a
tmedical geneticist or genetic counselor? There's an open question

about the temporal limits on an investigator's obligation to look for
incidental findings, so what we know now is different from what
we will know in five years or in ten years. Do I have to keep going
back and looking at this data, trying to find new incidental genetic
findings? And hosi much work should this resource excuse be
allowed to do?
At NIH, we're struggling with this. Actually, the whole genomnic
research community is struggling with this---the NIH Ethical,
Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) Research Program just put
out two large grant proposals. It's their big focus, and this next
year we'll be funding research into answering this question about
incidental findings. So, I'm happy to talk about any of the details
in more depth during the questions and answers. Thank you very
much.
REMARKS FROM STACEYk M.,, BRAN DEN BU1."RG3***
Good morning. I've been asked to speak on the privacy implications
of personalized medicine, and this topic is very vast, and there are
any number of avenues we could take. Before I go into that, I just
want to say listening to all of this has been fascinating. I appreciate
Justin Shore and the Health Law and Justice Initiative for inviting
us to participate, because it's an aspect of these issues that we don't
always get to delve into. Among the issues that we could look at
are electronic health records, the genetic issues, some of which
my colleague will address next. I want to focus on personal health
records.
When you think of a medical health record, probably most of us
envision the manila folders that our doctor brings to each visit and
reviews containing our charts and records. That's not exactly wihat
I'm talking about here. What I'm talking about are personal health
records. So they are records that you maintain through a resource
for yourself Nosi, you can grant access to those records to any
number of parties, and we'll go into how this would work. But the
key here, and what distinguishes these records from those that you
typically would find in a doctor's office, is that you have control
over this database of information.
Let's talk through how personal health records work. Many of you
may have heard of this; some of you may already be enrolled in one
of them. Personal health records are typically maintained online,
and companies such as Google operate them-Google calls theirs
Google Health. What you do to participate is to go into Google
Health; you sign up, you create a user name, you create a passwvord,

and then you decide howyou want to participate. You can give access
to your physicians to deposit records into your personal health
record, or PHR. You could grant a specialist the right to view your
primary care physician's records, which could simplify the process
of making a copy, say, of a test that's administered by a specialist
and then sending it to your primary care physician. The idea here
is to help facilitate your management of your records. In addition
to having your doctor's records in a common place, there are other
possible uses; you could give access rights to your personal trainer
at the Washington Sports Club. She could then upload your training
program and track your progress, tell you you're going to run three
miles next week at an eight-minute mile pace instead of the tenand-a-half-minute mile pace you've been working at this week.
You could also take advantage of some of the online applications,
and there are many of these out there. There's one, which Ijust read
about, called "Withings," which apparently is a scale that allows
you-in real time-to weigh yourself in the privacy of your own
home and then upload that information into your personal health
record to allow you to manage your weight, your diet, your exercise,
whatever it is that you want to do that pertains to your health.
Another example of a possible application is to enable a pharmacist
to send you, either by e-mail or through a text message, reminders
to take a daily medication or to refill a prescription. So you have all
this information in one place, and that seems like a great benefit.
One other benefit is that a PHR allows you to access this
information, since it', online, from any location. For example, if
you have a medical problem away from home, you can log on and
obtain whatever information you need to know. Let me give you a
slightly silly example, but it's something that actually happened to
me. Imagine that you're traveling and you step on a rusted nail. It
punctures your shoe, goes into your foot. You find yourself in the
emergency room, and the doctor asks. "When was your last tetanus
shot?" You have no idea. I had no idea. Well, using a PHR, I could
hop on my Smart Phone, my Blackberry, or any available computer
and log in and pull up my doctor's records, and answer the question
right then and there, any time of day or night.
So far, this sounds like a great resource. So what's the problem?
I'm here to talk about privacy implications with personal health
care, so there clearly has to be some issue. Well, there are several.
Most of them arise out of the unintended, undesired, and sometimes
even unknowing disclosure of health related information to third
parties. Basically, by placing information on a PER, you're sharing
that information with more entities than those youi specifically grant
access. So now I'm sure you're asking. 'lion is that possible if the
whole point is, that I can control my nmedical infornmation and 1 have
access to it?" Well, many of the PERs are advertising supported
vendor services such as Google. I don't mean to pick on Google, but
it's a brand that you would know, so I think it is a useful example.
What this means-to be an advertising supported vendor serv iceis that the business model often depends on sharing user patient
information with advertisers. This information may be shared in
de-identified form. wxhich means that your name and specific
identifiers may be separated from whatever information is shared,
but there's a catch. Let me explain to you how this might work.

A pharmaceutical company, which would be the advertiser in this
case, would come to your PHR, to Google Health, and say, "I would
like to serve an act call it, 'ad A,' for an acne medication, and I
would like it to be delivered to those individuals who are single,
between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five, and who suffer from
acne." Well, Google Health has all that information on you, and in
an anonymous way, it will serve ads. Even Google Health may not
specifically know who receives the ad. It will probably collect that
information in some sort of aggregate form. It may not say that
Stacey Brandenburg fits this demographic, but it will serve the ads,
nonetheless. The pharmaceutical company, at this point, has still
received no information about you.
Until you click on the ad. As soon as you click on the ad, you
are now in that pharmaceutical company's website, or in their
database, and they know that they served "ad A" to this particular
demographic. And so therefore, they know that you, who are
now on their site, have these conditions or have an interest in this
product. If you combine that with the fact that most users have
cookies on their computers and these cookies may be read by other
entities, the pharmaceutical company could probably pair you with
this particular health condition. Or, they may be able to learn other
information about you-, which they could use to then target more
ads. That's the next step. Once that pharmaceutical company has
this information, there are no restrictions as to how they can use it.
They could keep it for as long as they like. They can share it; they
can de-aggregate it; they can do whatever they want with it because
disclosure to either the PHR or the pharmaceutical company in this
case, is not in any way protected. They're not covered entities, so
there are no privacy protections for you, as the patient, once your
information is there.
Now, there's been some discussion about whether PHRs that are
operated in part by a covered entity-maybe the hospital is running
its own PHR or a health care plan is running its own sponsored
PHR are covered. In these cases, a PHR could be considered
part of a covered entity under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), but most of these are not. Congress
tried to capture the PHRs with some language that it added in
the American Recovery and Re-Investment Act in 2009, which
said that if a P1R has a certain kind of relationship or a contract
with a covered entity, say, with a clinic, it could be brought in
under the definition of a covered entity under HIPAA. So Google
Eealth has a relationship, I believe, with the Mayo Clinic, and that
arguably would qualify. Yet Google Health states very clearly and
very explicitly on its website that it is not HIPAA covered; your
informiation is not protected under EIPAA. This issue is yet to be
worked out. but for the time being you can assume that vvhatexver
infoirmation you've provided is outside the punview of any privacy
protectioins
This raises a potential concern about shairing health-related
information vvith a third party. By proividing your information,
even inadvertently, to the pharmaceuflcal company or to the PER,
you've arguably waived, certainly for the purpose of litigation, a
doctor-patient piivilege protection. And for those of you vho are
attorneys, or planning to be attorneys, that's something important

to keep in mind. There's even been some speculation that if you
were to view your PHR while, say, on an employer's computer-most employers are explicit when they give you the right to have a
computer that they are monitoring your e-mail and monitoring your
Internet use. That's a right that they have, and they often do that.
If you pull up your PHR and you view that information on your
employer's computer, not only have you likely waived the privilege,
but you may have inadvertently shared some information with your
employer that you didn't intend to share.
The key here is not that PHRs are evil-there are some tremendous
benefits to them-but to note that they also pose very real risks, and
it's important for users to understand those risks and understand
how they choose to utilize them in order to protect themselves.
Thank you.
REMARKS F1IRO"M MELANIETPLN
Y**
Good afternoon. I'm thrilled to be here, and I'm going to be
talking about some privacy issues in personalized medicine. This
is really a critical time in the field of personalized medicine. The
promise of both genomic research and individualized approaches
to health care is phenomenal., but our ability to realize that promise
is limited. And it's limited, I think, in part. by fear. Americans
are very wary of having genetic testing done for fear that their
genetic information will be used against them. In a 2000 survey
of about 1,200 Americans, 93 percent of respondents., or nine out
of ten people, said employers and health insurers should not have
access to their genetic test results. More than 68 percent of patients
in another survey said that they would not bill their insurance
companies for genetic tests, recognizing that these tests are very
expensive. They wouldn't bill their insurance companies for genetic
tests and clinical oncology for fear of discrimination, and more than
a quarter of survey respondents said they would take tests only if
they could use an alias.
Patients need to feel confident that their genetic information is not
going to be used against them, or the great potential of personalized
medicine may never be realized. That's how genetic information
privacy was born. Initially, genetic pnvacy in the United States

largely was governed by a patchwork quilt of federal and state
laws. At the federal level, HIPAA, which we've already referenced,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 each offered soiie limited federal protections against genetic
discrimination. In addition, about thirty states have genetic privacy
laws, and those laws varied widely. One of the problems was that
they were inconsistent and sometimes had inadequate definitions of
genetic information, and the state laws just failed to provide some
meaningful remedies for genetic discrimination. So in the nineties,
genetic experts were convinced that reforms were needed. They
urged the government to pass legislation, and they urged that it be
passed as soon as possible. They wanted to provide all Americans
with protection against genetic discrimination and health care and
employment.
The first federal legislation was then introduced in 1995. As soon
as possible turned out to be thirteen years later. Congress passed
the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act. GINA. President
Bush signed the law in 2008, and GINA plugged some of the most
obvious holes in the patchwork quilt of federal and state statutory
protections against the misuse of genetic information. GINA
effectively set a floor; it set a minimum level of protection against
genetic discrimination. The federal floor superseded weaker state
laws, but it left state legislators free to enact stronger protections
where necessary. Senator Kennedy---the late Senator Kennedy--who co-sponsored GINA in the Senate, referred to it as the first
major civil rights law of the twenty-first century because it protects
individuals from discrimination on the basis of their genetic
information in both the employment and the health care context.
Although GINA is described as an anti-discrimination law, it's
also appropriately viewed as a privacy law because it helps to
ensure that a patient's genetic information is going to be used
only for the purposes that the patient desires. Controlling use of
one's information is considered by many to be the touchstone of
information privacy. All right, one additional point about the
substance of GINA, that GINA actually amended IIIPAA. HIPAA
itself is probably the most significant federal medical privacy
statute in the United States. As you know, it includes substantive
privacy protections for protected health information, which is a
defined term under the Act. GINA effectively amended IIIPAA
so that genetic information is now deemed to be protected health
information under HIIPAA. Therefore, the information is afforded
the same privacy protections as other protected health infornation.
There's general agreement that GINA is landmark legislation and
that it removed serious obstacles to personalized niedicine, but it
isn't a cure-al. Virst, it protcts againt e~mploymcnt and he~alth
care discrimination. It doesn't protect patients from discrimination
outside of those contexts: in obtaining life insurance, disability
insurance, or long-term care insurance. Second. it only protects
pre~dictive genetic infoirmation; it doesn't protect information from
a genetic test that's related to a condition a patient already has.
If genetic testing xvere performed on a tumor to form treatment
decisions, that xwouldn't be protected by GINA. And finally. GINA
classifies information as protected health information under
HIPAA, so genetic information can be shared without patient

consent, to the extent permissible under HIPAA. This means it can
be shared without patient consent in connection with treatment,
with payment, and with oversight of the health care system, as an
example. So, critics are arguing that GINA effectively legalized the
sharing of genetic information among many health care entities
without patient permission. Note that to the extent that this criticism
is valid, it's really a criticism of the underlying IIIPAA regulations
and not a criticism of GINA. IThat said, there are lots of potential
weaknesses with GINA, but it does mark an important step in the
journey toward genetic privacy.
It really specifically protects two different aspects of privacy. First,
it amends HIPAA to apply to genetic information, and in doing so
it substantially restricts disclosure of genetic information in the first
place. Second, it prohibits the misuse of genetic information once
the information has been disclosed.
We kind of have a sense now of the existing legal framework for
genetic privacy, and what I'd like to do is take a few minutes to
address what I see as the threshold legal question in the creation of
a framework for the protection of genetic information privacy, and
that question is, is genetic information property? Lots of theorists
advocate treating genetic information as property. The leading
group of bioethicists who drafted the Genetic Privacy Act have taken
the position that certain identifiable genetic information should be
treated as property. Numerous states have taken this position in their
statutes, many of which were based on the Genetic Privacy Act.
New Jersey, for example, has one of the broadest state protections
of genetic privacy, and they expressly declare an individual's
genetic information is the property of the individual. So., should we
use a property rights framework to protect our interest in genetic
information? Well, we already conceptualize genetic information as
property in some contexts. Federal law allows researchers to patent
genes and gene fragments, and some researchers have embraced
a propertization of genetic information as a way to reap monetary
rewards from their work.
An often heard argument in favor ofpropertizing genetic information
is that genetic privacy protections might be stronger if people
thought of genetic information as a property right. Historically,
what does property protect? It protects things that are important
to us. things like our home and our land. We use the language of
property to talk about these things, and property has a very long,
well-established tradition. Propertizing genetic information would
enable people to take oxwnership of it and to protect it. In addition,
there's a market in personal information already. So propertization
of genetic information simply allows indixviduals to participate in
this market because. it allows indixviduals to bargain and to sell their
personal inforniation. IThat's already being done; ne're just not
participating at the individual level. Treating genetic information
as property also gixves us control oxver information. It alloxws us to
make choices about vwhen to ielinquish our inforniation and on wxhat
terms. And this is true because property rules require a negotiation
before a taking. So, for example, I'm nearing a ring. I can sell it to
yon for fifteen dollars, or I can reinse to sell it to yon on the grounds
that it has sentimental value to me. No one can take my ring from
me without first negotiating with me. Property rules permit me

to waive a right or protect it as I see fit, and they also respect the
different values that a person places on something, whether they're
sentimental or otherwise.
That said, propertizing genetic information obviously is not without
drawbacks. Critics of the model argue that it doesn't capture many
of the most important interests that we have in genetic information.
Specifically. under a property rights model, genetic information
is viewed as a commodity; it is disaggregated from the individual
to whom it relates. Under a privacy model, genetic information
is something in which we have a dignity interest. It relates to our
personhood. Property also connotes control within the marketplace,
and it essentially protects economic interests in genetic information.
In contrast, privacy connotes a different kind of control: control
over access to ourselves. It can protect us against improper use of
genetic information in ways that property can't. Another difficulty
with propertizing genetic information is the difficultly assigning a
proper value to genetic information. Potential future uses of genetic
information may be unknown when the information is being bought
or sold. It precludes individuals from making an appropriate
valuation.
Also, to the extent that a property model invites us to sell our
genetic information, one real concern is that we will sell our genetic
information and the price will be disconcertingly cheap, as it has
been in other contexts for personal information. How many of us
have traded away significant amounts of personal information in
return for a grocery store discount card or for a free Gmail account?
All of us, right? Another concern with propertization is that patients
might decide not to sell their genetic information to doctors or to
researchers or to sell it for a prohibitively high price. If genetic
information were propertized, a patient could enjoin medical
researchers from using patient data in certain ways, even if the uses
of that data were socially beneficial.
For these reasons, medical researchers and biotechnology companies
are often concerned about the availability of genetic information for
research. They have a vested interest in making sure the patients
can't exercise property rights over their own information. Indeed,
biotechnology companies have lobbied heavily against statutes like
the New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act because they declare people to
have a property right in genetic information. And what's interesting
to note here, of course, is that medical researchers and others in the
medical community are not necessarily objecting to the treatment
of genetic inforniation as property. IThey're just concerned about the
property right being assigned to patients.
So one final point: xwhen we propertize genetic inforniation,
there's an issue. Property generally is sold xvithout restrictions on
alienability. This means that the buyer of the property is generally
free to do xvith it as he vvishes. So you buy niy carn I can no longer
control what you do with my car. This vvorked really xwell nhen
we nwere talking about cars, btit it's unclear hon this concept of
alienability applies vwhen it comes to genetic information. Just
because I decitde I'im wvilling to givc miy genctic information to
my doctor doesn't mean that I want my doctor to be free to use
my genetic information as he wishes. And one of the weaknesses

of propertizing genetic information is that it doesn't address this
problem of keeping data subject to a variety of different constraints.

won't be used against them or the great potential of personalized
medicine will never be realized. Thank you.

Okay, so the point of this whole discussion: we have to take care not
to undermine our privacy in our very attempts to protect it. Genetic
privacy laws in New Jersey and other states are propertizing genetic
information, but it's unclear that the approach is optimal, and as
we work to develop our legal framework we have to address these
issues and not lose sight of some of the underlying values at stake.

REMARKS FROM

Final issue: regardless of whether we propertize genetic information
or not, there may be limits on genetic privacy. In this regard, I want
to mention just briefly, a very important case that's likely to have
substantial impact on the future contours of genetic information
privacy. The case is called Sorrell v. JAIS, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari just about a month ago, on January 7th. Sorrell
was the third in a series of challenges to privacy legislation in
New England, and it involves the constitutionality of a privacy
law that was passed in Vermont. Apparently, when you go to fill a
prescription in Vermont, the pharmacy is required by law to keep
track of the drug that was prescribed, the doctor who prescribed it,
and some information about the patient., most notably, their gender
and their age. The pharmacies then routinely sell this information
to data mining companies. An example of such a company is
IMS. They're a data mining company that collects and sells data
on about three-quarters of the prescriptions that are filled in over
one hundered countries. As you can imagine, that's an enormous
amount of data.
The data mining companies process the information; then they
produce very detailed reports. These reports detail individual
doctors' practices: for example, what a doctor prescribes, when they
prescribe it, and to whom. The data mining companies sell their
reports to pharmaceutical companies so that the latter can more
efficiently target their prescription drug marketing. Nermont passed
a law restricting the use and the sale of prescriber identifying data
for pharmaceutical marketing. IMS., one of the largest of these data
ining companies, challenged the law, and it's very interesting to
see on what grounds. They challenged the law on First Amendment
grounds. At issue in Sorre!! is the extent to which the First
Amendment restricts Vermont's ability to regulate the sale and
use of data identifying health care providers' prescribing patterns.
The Second Circuit in this case said Vermont violated the First
Amendment by placing these restrictions. The First Circuit, which
looked at the laws in Maine and New Hampshire, came out on the
opposite side. They said, "No First Amendment violation." These
restrictions were restrictions on conduct and not on speech, and
they weic peimissible re.stiictions on eonduct. There's nuw a circuit
split, and that's how the Supreme Court got the case.
So keep your eyes on this case. Sorrel! could haxe enormous
consequences for personalized medicine. To wxhat extent is the
First Amendment going to act as a limit on privacy? How xvill the
Supreme C ourt wxeight patient priv acy interest in these matters
invohving the tiransfei of sensitive prescribing information? These
questions are for the moment unanswered, but one thing is very
clear. Patients must feel confident that their genetic information
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Hello! I'm the token scientist on Panel Two. My good friend and
colleague Julie DeLoia was the token scientist on Panel One. I don't
know who the token scientist is on Panel Three. But because I'm
the token scientist, and I'm in a room full of attorneys and budding
attorneys, I feel I can tweak you a little bit.
So I want to ask a question. Does anybody in the room know what
the Selden Patent is? You who have laptops open, if you get really
bored during my talk, you can Google the Selden Patent. The Selden
Patent may have something to do with all the patent issues around
patenting of gene sequences, in my opinion, that is. And since I'm
not part of the federal government, I don't have to give a disclaimer
on that. So, let's talk about money, okay? The topic I was asked
to address was budgetary considerations of personalized medicine,
and my first thought on that was, "Oh my god, I'm a scientist. I can't
talk about money." But then I realized I came from industry so I
have to talk about money. So budgetary issues, and a lot of the data
I'm going to be talking about is coming from several studies that
have been done, really, in the last several years-one from Deloitte
and one from MIT looking at return on investment.
I'm going to focus on three broad areas: one is the costs to health
care of personalized medicine approaches, one is the cost of product
development in the personalized medicine space, and I'm going to
make a few comments on reimbursement. You've already heard
quite a bit about reimbursement, and then I'm going to just ask
some "what if" questions at the very end. And to frame the "wx
hat
if" questions so you can start thinking about this a little bit, Julie
did a wonderful job of going through the science and the technology
behind genomic medicine. But, I didn't really hear anybody get up
and give a definition of personalized medicine, so I'm going to
give you one. This is actually the definition that's been somewhat
accepted by the President's Council and by the Secretary's Advisory
Council for a definition of personalized health care. Notice I did
not say, "personalized medicine"; I said, "personalized health care,"

and that definition runs something like this. Personalized health care
is the medically meaningful segmentation of patient populations by
whatever technology is appropriate: it might be genomic; it might
be imaging; it could be informatic; it could be something we haven't
even thought of yet, in order to increase the benefit of therapy.
Notice it's not specific to genetic or genomic medicine; it broadens it
out considerably into a somewhat broader concept ofpersonalization
of care. So, let's talk about costs to health care of personalized
medicine or personalized health care approaches. And I have to
reframe that question a little bit. Does personalized medicine have a
quantifiable return on investment for the various segments of health
care? I'm going to cite a couple of examples, and one's already been
mentioned several times. It's in the area of adverse event avoidance,
warfarin testing, and this was talked about a couple of times. Let
me give you some data. Genetic testing to guide warfarin dosing
could avoid 85,000 serious bleeding events and 17,000 strokes
annually in the United States. The cost for severe bleeding event is
approximately $13,500. The cost for stroke is $39,500. You can do
the math. Estimate a potential annual health care cost savings from
individual dosing of warfarin, based on genetic testing, between
$1.1 billion and $2 billion, with a range from $100 million to $2
billion. What a deal! Pretty good savings on the health care system
from a simple genomically based multivariant array test, approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Evidence of clinical
utility was acquired for that approval. Yet as you heard earlier today,
it is not widely adopted. And there are various reasons for that. Yes,
it is only partially reimbursed by some of the public payers. It is
used by the active military-Army, Navy, and Air Force. So since
I'm talking about money, let's ask the question. Whose cash cow is
being gored by warfarin testing'? Where is the testing that is done
over a period of seventeen days if you are receiving warfarin to find
out if you are hypercoagulated or hypocoagulated? Anybody know?
The hospital. The hospital owns the Coumadin clinic. On average, a
patient being put on Coumadin/warfarin will spend seventeen days
in and out of a Coumadin clinic while they set the dose because,
let's face it, Coumadin is nasty stuff, and you've got to be real
careful with it.
So how much incentive does a hospital have to implement a genomic
test that is going to cut that, say, from seventeen days to a couple
of days? You start to see part of the issue here. It is not all about
science and ethics; sometimes money gets in the way. too. Let's
talk about treatment costs. I'm going to talk about a drug called
Gleevecc. Most of you have probably seen stories about Gleevcc.
It wxas touted a number of years ago and wvas on the cover of lime
as the wxonder drug for treatment of chronic myeloid leukemia.
Not everybody responds to Gleevecc, and there is a diagnostic test
to predict wxho xvill respond xwhich is used in conjunction vvith a
prescription for Gleevec. IThe treatment cost of chronic myelogic
leukenia progression includes chronic phase in-patient costs of
$998 a day; accelerated based in-patient costs of $1,400 a day,
and if you're in iough shape and in blast crisis, $1,433 pcr day. For
those patients that respond to Gleevec (wxhich. by the wxay, is not a
cheap drug; not quite as expensive as Avastin, but pretty pricey)
and we can identify those patients that will respond to Gleevec
therapy, that's a pretty good deal, too, isn't it? Axvoidance of those

downstream costs, by treatment with Gleevec? And we can identify
the responder in populations so there's no futile therapy with an
expensive drug?
Now, let's talk about the cost of care, specifically viral genotyping
for interferon treatment of Hepatitis C. And by the way, the studies
that I'm about to talk to you about were not done by the pharma
companies, and they were not done by academia-they were not
done by NIH or FDA. They were done by a payer, Aetna, who
was interested in finding out whether there were potential R01
from a personalized medicine approach to therapy. And, of course,
Aetna, being a major payer, has access to massive amounts of
patient information and patient data. They can say to their member
physicians, "Here is the guideline for therapy we want you to followx,
and we will collect data on the results." The guideline they put
forward was mandated viral genome testing for Hepatitis C virus to
determine the dose of interferon that would be used to treat the Rep
C infection. If you don't get the dose of the interferon right: it is not
a pleasant thing, but tailoring the dose to the specific genotype of
the Hep C virus could eliminate a lot of the issues around interferon
therapy, some of wx
hich have to do with compliance-patients tend
not to take things that make them feel lousy.
They actually stopped the trial after about six months because
what they were finding was astounding. By instituting viral
genotyping into the physician guideline for dosing of interferon,
they saw changes in the efficacy of the therapy, including changes
in compliance, and moreover, they were able to show the savings in
treatment costs to their leadership. So, is there evidence of return on
investment from personalized medicine-based therapy'? The ansvwer
is yes. Is it enough? No! We are still in the early days of trying
to quantify the actual benefit of therapy for using personalized
medicine therapies.
So does personalized medicine have a quantifiable return on
investment? Yes, but it's probably going to be horses for courses.
Some sectors of health care will derive more benefit than others.
There was a study that was done last year by Deloitte which looked
at the sectoral differences in return on investment and saw some
really defined differences in that return, but through them all, the
group that benefited the most, in terms of return on investment
from personalized medicine were patients. Payers were sort of plusminus. It depended a bit on the type of therapy and the area being
looked at. The pharmaceutical companies wxere a bit iffy, again,
depending on the area, Prov iders xwere routinely positive on the
return on investment, but patients xxere vvay above all the rest of the
sectors. That should drive something.
Let's move on to cost of product development. The costs of
developing a new drug currently, depending npon vwho you read, is
something north of $2billion. That's an anwful lot of money. Non that
does include lost opportunity costs, one in ten drugs make it, but I
don't care hovv big yon are, vvhether you're a Pfizer or a Glaxo-Smnith
Kline, wxhoever, no company can sustain that lexvel of investment for
long. If yon simply tack on the cost of dcv eloping an associated
diagnostic plus-and we haven't really talked about evidence-based
medicine here-have to do a comparative effectiveness trial as well,
those figures go rapidly north of $3 billion per drug. The return on

investment is something on the order of four times the development
cost. You can't run a business that way. So a lot of people look at the
pharmaceutical industry and say, "Why aren't they getting on board
with this?" The fact of the matter is, they're behind the eight ball,
big time right now And you're starting to see some of the effects.
There is increasing recognition in the industry that if we keep going
the way we are currently developing and commercializing products,
whether it's a pharmaceutical product or a drug device (and you
heard it, all the issues are about regulation and reimbursement
for devices as well as pharmaceutical products) that return on
investment is going to drop steadily, and it will kill innovation in
new product development in this country. We have to rethink the
way products are developed. We have to start looking at associated
diagnostic development at day one of the development process. not
the end, which is where it is done now. We have to start building
in plans for doing comparative effectiveness research, guided by
a diagnostic comparison in an effective way to start to bring that
development cost down. Ihere's been some figures done, at MIT
that we may need to completely rethink the entire development
process. That means rethinking the regulatory process as well. And
you've heard all the problems around laboratory development tests.
Those are going to pale in comparison to the rework that we need to
do on the development process.
Reimbursement, again, we heard about that at the beginning of the
first panel. In terms of real world immediate things that have to
get done, ne have to fix reimbursement for medical devices and
associated molecular diagnostics. Pharmaceutical products are
reimbursed on the basis of their value to medicine. This drug, and
you have produced data for that (that's a lot of the $2 billion cost of
development) benefits patients and medicine this way. Therefore,
we will approve coverage and reimbursement at this level. That
doesn't happen for diagnostic tests. no matter how sophisticated the
test is. Right novv, if you go to the trouble to develop a diagnostic
product, and you put it either through the FDA processes or through
the CLIA process, you will likely be cross-walked to something
that vaguely looks and smells like this test for your reimbursement
rate. And guess what? It's nowhere near the reimbursement value
of the pharmaceutical product, even for a linked product. And not
only that, if you are a good boy-you take your tests, and you go
back and you have a six-step test and you make it a two-step test,
you pull some steps out and make it easier-you've just cut your
reimbursement by tno-thirds because you now have a tno-step test
rather than a six-step test. What's the incentive? What's the RO01 fbr
a diagnostic company to play that game for much longer?
And part of this, is indeed the relationship between pharmna and the
diagnostic companies, in terms of companion diagnostics. Part of it
is still the conundrum or the murkiness at FDA. which hopefully is
about to get resolved. All these things are in play, but at the bottom
line, it comcs back to vvho's going to make the investment and vvhat
is the return on that investment? From a company from society,
from its goxvernance. Noxw, I'm going to ask some of the "vvhat
if" type questions. There's ahnays been some interesting dialogue
going on among the intelligentsia in personalized health care
around evolution of the "p." The "p" in "personalized medicine,"

or the "p" in "personalized health care." Today, that "p" is defined
as "prescriptive care." You go in to the doctor; you present with
symptoms. lie may or may not choose to do a test; he reacts to that
test: he puts you on something or gives you some sort of therapeutic
modality to take care of you. You may or may not comply. In most
cases, you don't (there's a lot of statistics around that) and part of
that is because you really don't know what is going to work for you.
So the doctor engages in essentially trial and error medicine until
they find something that works for you. In the meantime, it's costing
an awful lot of money. It may or may not have been futile., in terms
of your therapy, if not toxic to your actual nell-being. Well, what we
want to do is move the "p" from being "prescriptive" to "precision."
We'll use a diagnostic test, an informatic test, whatever, to increase
the precision of our diagnosis so that we may treat you more
effectively. We will increase the benefit of therapy. Well, then,
where after that? The most usual interpretation is ve're going from
"precision medicine" to "preventive medicine." We will figure out
what's going to be wrong with you before it actually happens to you,
and we make sure it doesn't happen, either to be watched, changed,
or some palliative therapy ahead of time. The problem is nobody
will reimburse for that right now; no single payer will reimburse for
preventive therapy right now. A lot of the genomic research being
done-and it's good research, and it should be done, and it needs to
continue-centers around how to predict disease, yet the system is
not prepared for that.
The next "p" that people talk about is "participatory medicine,"
"personalized records." How do we move to true patient-centric
care? Right now we have provider-centric care. Even in the widely
touted medical home concepts that are being thrown around, they are
still provider-centric care. How do ve move to true patient-centnc
care, where the patient is completely and optimally positioned in
their own care decisions, using genomic information to help make
their joint treatment decision with their caretaker? That's a ways
away, and we don't even know how to think about that one in terms
of RO1.
And there's a last "p" that's just starting to be discussed. It's called
"performance medicine." I'm not going to say a whole lot about
this one because it is very nenw, and I'm not sure I want to go there.
When the "p" actually equals "preventive medicine," will we reap
the benefits of improved personal health? When the "p" equals
participatory medicine, will we reap the benefits of improved
community health? Can xwe cxven measure that right noxw? Not xvery
well. Thank you xvery much.

QUSTION You said a lot about a lot of states and feder'al things
moving to propertizing genome or genetic information material.
Hayve you seen any states moving tovvards a pirivacy version of that?
And is that changing'?
STACEY/ BADNURG: Ys.Itis,
actually, and it's
something
that is still in flux across the country, in terms of information anti
privacy more generally. We haven't yet figured out what the right
model is or if there's one model that's one size fits all, or vhether

it needs to be based on the context and genetic information. It does
seem to be that property is the dominant model.

QUESTION: Are doctor records comprehensible to you, and do
you have access to them? Does their availability have a chilling
effect on what your doctors write?
STACEY BRANDENBURG: Good questions. Your records,
including your doctor's notes, you have a right to obtain them.
Whether you can decipher their handwriting, their notes, it's a
short form that's left to you and your doctor to work out. As for
the chilling effect, it depends on the purpose for which the doctor
is writing that information down. If the doctor knows that you are
going to be posting those records and you have a particular., there are
certain sensitive illnesses, which it is not acceptable, it's not legal
for that doctor to be disclosing to be shared. HIV is one of them.
So, if you communicate with your doctor that you are planning to
put those records in a PHR, and the PHR may be one that is a third
party entity, it's possible that you have a conversation with your
doctor about the fact that you're going to do that, and, "Can you not
make some particular notes?" But I would think that-and I don't
know that much about the ethics for the physician-the physician
has to put in his or her records what accurately represents his or her
treatment of you. I think there are conversations that doctors have
that are sort of a sidebar, for instance, with insurance companies:
"Can you code this as an X because this is how I will receive, how
it gets under my insurance plan?"
So those sort of sidebar conversations do occur, but as for whether
the doctor is going to somehow change what is reflected in his or
her records, I don't think that would be within the ethical bounds of
what is appropriate. Will they think twice about writing something in
a record because they know that they could be exposing something?
It's possible, but I think that really is an issue that is probably not
entirely appropriate for the doctor to be engaging in.

QUESTION: As a follow up, doesn't that diminish the value of
that doctor's records?
MELANIE TEPLINSKY: Let me take a stab at this. There are
two kinds of records. There are personalized health records and
electronic health records. And personalized health records are the
records that you yourself choose to put in a cloud or wherever else
that belong to you. Electronic records are the doctor's records, and
doctors typically claim ownership of them. So, to the extent that
the doctor has a duty of confidenitiality to the patient, if the~patient
is putting the records online, there's no issue because the patient
decided to put those records online. It's a consensual decision. To
the extent that the doctor houlds the iecords, the electronic health
records issue, that's a separate issue xwith a nhole host of other
policy issues, But the doctor's speech xxouldn't be chilled in that
case because there is no giving of the doctor's records to a third
party. The doctor's records are being held by the doctor: they're lust
in electronic form. So, I think they're xery distinct issues.
WAYN
TOENRNS: When you're going to flip it around
a little bit, does your doctor know what's in the medical record?
And can he interpret What's in the record? And I mean that not
sort of frivolously for two reasons. One, as genomic, medically

useful genomic information becomes available-and we're getting
more and more-most physicians that are practicing today cannot
interpret that information. It's an appalling statistic. It used to be
six medical schools in the entire country actually taught a class
in genetics, much less genomics. I don't think it's quite that bad
anymore, but at one time it really was there. And then you look
at the business plans for some of the DTC genomic, consumer
genomic groups. I'm not going to talk of them by name, but the
expectation is that you buy your sequence from them. For that
portion you order, they send you a report, and you are urged to share
that report with your physicians. Ninety-five percent of physicians
in America cannot interpret that report, so it really does become
sort of meaningless information.
There's another sort of interesting build on the personalized
health care side as well. Cleveland Clinic and Mayo Clinic are
experimenting with it as well, something called a tethered PHR,
which is actually a patient portal basically into their electronic
health record. And rather than having two completely separate., one
is linked to the other one. It's a very interesting concept, but they are
dealing with issues of, "Where's the cut? How much data is shared?"
And part of that is if a Cleveland Clinic patient leaves Northern
Ohio and goes to San Francisco. and that patient wants to take his
or her records along, which is really a lot of what was intended,
does that elicit a different level of download into a protected area
on your thumb drive or something like that, that you take with you
to your other physician'? But all these issues are generating some
very interesting solutions as well. There's a tool called Archimedes,
which is actually available from the American Diabetes Association
website. It's sponsored through Kaiser. If you're a Kaiser patient
and you have diabetes and your physician is thinking about putting
you on a new diabetic therapy, you can go on to Archimedes, push
a button, give it some information about who you are, and the
Archimedes tool, which is basically a disease model, goes out and
pulls your electronic medical record data from Kaiser, plugs it into
the model and spits back data to you as a patient in a digestible
format of what you can expect from that new drug therapy.
And when you start to think about if that became very widespread
and Cleveland Clinic is experimenting with something along the
sarne lines you have this incredible potential for the consumer and
the patient to really take some ownership, and we start to get toward
participatory care, but then you run into all these other issues which
become very, xvery dificult to negotiate. One of my old mentors
xwas a gentleman named Dr. George Post, xvho xvas head of R&D
at Smith Kline. Back in the early nineties. I kind of asked him this
question, and wxhat he told me and wxhat I thin might actually come
out is, "Where is the greatest benefit?" If the ethics and the prixvacy
considerations get in the xway of densving benefit, ultimately they
will xxork out. but there wxill be a lot of chaos in betxveen. I think xxe
are just starting to tip into the chaos side.
AlER
'O (Lindsay Wiley): Thank you so much. I hope you
will all join me in thani ng our panel.

